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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
As indicated by the Appellant, the Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction 
over this case in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), but has transferred the 
case to this court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
1. Was the Provo City Board of Adjustment's determination regarding the 
illegality of Petitioner's basement apartment arbitrary, capricious, or illegal? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews the decision of a Board of 
Adjustment "as if the appeal had come directly from the agency." Patterson v. Utah 
County Bd. of Adjustment 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App. 1995). Accordingly, the 
standard of review is the same as that stated in the Utah Code for the district court's 
review. Id. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3) such review shall presume the 
Board's decision is valid. "Thus, the Board's actions are accorded substantial deference 
and will be rejected on appeal only if they are so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and 
capricious or if they violate the law." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603. "[T]he Board's 
decision can only be considered arbitrary and capricious if not supported by substantial 
evidence." Id., at 604. This Court elsewhere stated that substantial evidence is "more 
than a mere 'scintilla'" of evidence . . . . though 'something less than the weight of the 
evidence.'" Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) 
(quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunicutt 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985), in turn quoting 
Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607 (1966)). Thus, in considering the question of substantial 
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evidence, this Court "must simply determine, in light of the evidence before the Board, 
whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the Board. It is not [the 
Court of Appeals'] prerogative to weigh the evidence anew." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the Board erred. Utah Code Ann. § 10-
9a-705. 
Appellant correctly indicates that this issue was raised before both the Board and 
the Fourth District Court. R. 341; R. 92-91. 
2. Is the Petitioner barred from raising her estoppel argument by her failure to 
raise this issue with the Board of Adjustment? 
Standard of Review: The question of issue preservation was obviously not 
presented to the Board of Adjustment as this question can only arise after the Board's 
decision is appealed. This question was raised in the District Court by Respondent and 
acknowledged by the judge. R. 322; R. 341-340. However, the District Court did not 
clearly rule on this question in its ruling or findings of fact. R. 342-336; R. 350-346. 
Perhaps this is because the District Court found that the city file that Petitioner claims to 
have relied upon was not "dispositive of the legal status of the basement apartment." R. 
337. Based on that finding, the District Court may have believed the estoppel argument 
was moot because there was not a clear or definitive act of the City for the Petitioner to 
have relied upon. As the District Court did not explicitly rule on Respondent's argument, 
there is no underlying decision for this Court to review for correctness. 
3. If the issue of estoppel was preserved, is Petitioner nonetheless barred from -
raising it against a governmental entity? 
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Standard of Review: As the estoppel argument has not previously been ruled on 
in this case, it was not preserved at the Board of Adjustment and Petitioner's claim of 
equitable estoppel is not properly before this Court. 
4. If Petitioner's estoppel argument is not barred, did Petitioner reasonably rely to 
her detriment upon a clear and definite act of the Respondents thus resulting in the 
Respondents being estopped from finding Petitioner's basement apartment to be illegal? 
Standard of Review: Petitioner's statement of the standard of review regarding 
this issue is potentially misleading. As Petitioner indicates, a claim of equitable estoppel 
is, indeed, a mixed question of law and fact. However, Petitioner asserts that none of the 
underlying facts of her estoppel claim are in dispute and asserts on that basis that, as in 
Taylor v. Utah State Training School 775 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah App. 1989), the 
"correction-of-error" standard should apply because the issue is a question of law only, 
not requiring the application of basic facts from the case. 
In fact, the facts upon which Petitioner's argument relies are very much in dispute. 
As an examination of the Board's Report of Action reveals, if the findings of fact of the 
Board of Adjustment are accepted, Petitioner's estoppel argument cannot stand. R. 291 -
288. Accordingly, this issue remains a mixed question of law and fact. As such, a 
spectrum of different standards from correctness to abuse of discretion has been applied 
by the appellate courts. Terry v. Retirement Bd., Public Employees' Health Program, 
2007 UT App 87, 157 P.3d 362, 364, (citing Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 
(Utah 1997)). The proper standard of review depends on such things as the agency's 
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expertise in a given area of law, the complexity of the legal question, and the policy 
concerns involved. Id 
In this case, the question of estoppel is not one within the Board of Adjustment's 
special purview, so a correction of error standard does apply to the Board's interpretation 
of the law of estoppel and the application of the facts to it. Id.; Taylor, 775 P.2d at 434. 
However, the Board's findings of fact related to this argument should still be reviewed 
under the substantial evidence standard described above. Drake, 939 P.2d at 181. 
As noted above, and discussed more thoroughly in the Argument section below, 
Respondents do not believe this issue was raised before the Board. Petitioner cites in her 
brief several sections of the record to support her claim that this issue was raised before 
the board. However, these sections, parsed thoroughly below, stand only for the 
propositions that (1) Petitioner believed at the time of the hearing that City's case file 
indicated a determination of legal nonconforming use in 1983 or (2) that Petitioner 
concluded from all the evidence she reviewed that the basement apartment was legal at 
the time she was purchasing it. R. 182:139 to 181:140-147; R. 186:44-46; R. 167:449-
454; and R. back of 276:2-5. Nowhere in the record, prior to the appeal to the Fourth 
District Court, did Petitioner specifically mention estoppel or generally allege that she 
bought the house specifically in reliance on the notes in the city's 22 year old case file. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-705: ~~ 
The appellant has the burden of proving that the land use authority erred. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3): 
(a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority 
of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative 
discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the" 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, 
ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time 
the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
Utah Rule App. Proc. 24(a)(9): 
An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing 
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking 
to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and 
set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
Provo City Code Chapter 14.36: See Addendum, Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Petitioner purchased a home within a residential zone where only single-family 
dwellings are permitted. Petitioner desires to rent out the basement of the home and -
claims the right to a nonconforming use. This case arises on appeal from the denial by 
the Provo City Board of Adjustment of Petitioner's request to find such a nonconforming 
use. 
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B. Procedural History and Disposition Below 
1. On April 24, 2006, Provo City staff issued a Zone Verification on the property located 
at 1295 Cedar Avenue, Provo, Utah. R. 69. The Zone Verification stated that the 
property was within a One Family Residential Zone and that the legal use of the property 
was as a One Family Dwelling only. 
2. Paragraphs 4-10 of the Procedural History section of Appellant's Opening Brief 
(found at pages 7-8) accurately detail the subsequent history and disposition, with the 
minor exception that in paragraph 7, Respondent's motion which was denied was actually 
Defendant's Motion to Strike Petitioner's Notice of Intent to File Summary Judgment 
Motion. R. 341 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Petitioner's residence, which is the center of this claim, is located at 1295 Cedar 
Avenue, Provo, Utah 84604. R. back of 285. The current zoning of the residence is Zone 
R1.8 - One Family Residential Zone, which allows only single family occupancy. R. 69. 
2. The residence was built in 1949 and 1950 by Leonard C. and Laura R. Madsen 
("Original Owners"). R. 270. During that period, the property location was within an 
Agricultural District, which permitted two-family dwellings. R. back of 291. 
3. The building permit for the property listed the building type as a "Dwelling." R. 270. 
Building permits from that time period and area for multi-family dwellings typically were 
explicit about the multi-family nature of the building, using terms such as "duplex" or 
"two-family dwelling." R. 114; R. 131; R. back of 37. 
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4. In 1954, the property's zoning changed. Since that time the relevant zoning 
ordinances have allowed single-family dwellings only. R. back of 291. 
5. The Original Owners, who are now deceased, remained at the residence until 1961. R. 
back of 282. Their daughter, Toni Shain, was contacted by various individuals involved 
in this case, including Petitioner. R. 106; R. 139:49-138:63. Mrs. Shain stated to these 
individuals that there was no kitchen in the basement. R. 130; R. 106; R. back of 61; R. 
41. To the Petitioner, Mrs. Shain said that she did not remember there being a kitchen 
and did not think there was one. R. 138:57-60; R. back of 99. Mrs. Shain also told 
Petitioner that she remembered her mother cooking for the renters on occasion. R. 138: 
57-60. She told Petitioner that the basement had a separate entrance. R. back of 99. It is 
not clear whether Mrs. Shain remembered there being a bathroom in the basement. R. 
138: 56-57; R. back of 99. She did remember renters staying in the basement, but the 
record doesn't reflect any statement as to whether the renters' presence was continuous or 
intermittent. R. 138; R. back 99. In her conversation with Ray Christensen, the Wasatch 
Neighborhood Chair, Mrs. Shain referred to the renters occupying "sleeping rooms," 
common parlance in that day for boarding rooms rather than a formal apartment. R. 130; 
R. 61;R.41. 
6. Petitioner had a plumber inspect the basement plumbing of the residence. R. back of 
286. The plumber concluded that the plumbing for the basement sink and bathroom was 
installed at the time the house was built. Id. During Petitioner's hearing before the 
Board, one Board member, Leonard Mackay, gave as his opinion, based on Petitioner's 
photographs of the plumbing and his personal knowledge of plumbing, that the plumbing 
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on the kitchen sink "was a clean out that something was added to later." R. 117. He also 
stated that he believed the shower drain to have originally been a standard flood drain 
that was later made into a shower by adding a rim directly on the previously laid flooring 
tile. R. 116 
7. In 1961, Jean and LaVerne Paulson ("Second Owners") purchased the residence from 
the Madsens. R. back of 282. The Second Owners owned the home until January 1963. 
R. 250. The eldest son of the Second Owners, J. Douglas Paulson ("Mr. Paulson"), 
provided an affidavit regarding his knowledge about this purchase. R. back of 98. The 
home was purchased when his father went to work at BYU. Id. Mr. Paulson's mother 
remained in California. Id. Apparently, Mr. Paulson never lived in the Cedar Avenue 
house, although he visited it on several occasions. Id. Mr. Paulson's understanding was 
that the ability to have renters in the basement was a "main factor" in his parents' 
decision to purchase the home. Id. To his knowledge, students lived in the basement 
throughout his parent's ownership of the home. Id. Mr. Paulson further affirmed that the 
living facilities in the basement were completely separate and included cooking facilities, 
although the record contains some contradictions as to whether he actually met any of the 
renters. Id.; R. 138: 74-76. To his knowledge, his parents never did any remodeling. R. 
back of 98. 
8. Byron and Edna Done ("Third Owners") bought the home from the Paulsons in 
January 1963 and owned it until Mrs. Done died in January 2006. R. 250. Several 
documents relating to this purchase are found in the record. R. 79-back of 76; R. 63. 
These documents refer to renters living both upstairs and downstairs. R. back of 79; R. 
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63. They also discuss whether certain furniture in the house will be included in the sale 
or retained by the Paulsons. Specifically, these references refer to furniture downstairs 
and kitchen appliances upstairs (a stove and refrigerator). R. 79; R. back of 77; R. back 
of 76. None of the letters refer to kitchen appliances downstairs. R. 79-back of 76; R. 
63. 
9. Polk & Cole Directories list one family residing at the residence prior to 1967. R. 
back of 107. The directories then show only one listing from 1974 to 1990. R. back of 
68. Two names are sporadically listed from 1990 to 2002. IcL 
10. During their ownership, the Third Owners undertook various remodeling projects. 
They "updated" the downstairs "kitchen" in 1963, but according to their daughter, 
Jeanine Gunn, did not install it. R. 97. According to Ray Christensen, the Wasatch 
Neighborhood Chair, neighbors observed that prior to 1964 the carport was converted 
into a kitchen and the kitchen (on the main floor) was made into a formal dining area. R. 
back of 60. This remodel also involved moving the washer and dryer from elsewhere in 
the home. Id. A carport and parking pad were also added in the front yard setback. R. 
69. No building permit was found in the City's records for any of these changes. Id, A 
building permit from 1966 does show the addition of a second floor to the residence. R. 
90. Mr. Christensen stated that the style of construction of the basement kitchen is 
consistent with the style of these modifications made in the 1960s rather than the style of 
the initial construction. R. back of 37. 
11. The Third Owners had renters in the basement during at least some periods of their 
ownership. R. 74. Their daughter states that "mother often had young couples living as 
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tenants." R. back of 75. The City opened a case file in 1983 in response to a complaint 
about the presence of renters in the home. R. 74. In response to this investigation, the 
Third Owners' son-in-law, John Hansen, Jr., wrote a letter asserting that the Third 
Owners had a "grandfather" right to have a basement apartment. He asserted that the 
Third Owners had owned the house for over 15 years and had continuously had students 
renting from them. R. 74 and back of 74. He requested the City find some way to record 
that this was not the first time that such complaints had been raised. R. back of 74. 
Accordingly, the text of his letter was typed into the City's case file. R. 74. The case file 
indicates a "Comp Date" of 84/6/29 without explaining what this means. R. back of 74. 
The case file then states that the status is "Closed" followed by a line reading 
"Conformed-Nonconforming." R. back of 74. The record is silent as to whether this case 
file was ever presented to the Third Owners or whether they ever received any other 
statement from the City regarding the legality or illegality of a basement apartment in 
their residence. 
12. Several neighbors testified before the Board as to periods during which the Third 
Owners were not renting out the basement. Andrew Gustafson, who lives two houses 
down the street, testified that Mrs. Done (the Third Owner) was his daughter's best friend 
and that he had personal knowledge that there were long periods of time during which the 
Third Owners did not have people living in the basement. R. 125. Lisa Wygant stated 
she had lived next door to the Third Owners since 1993 and indicated that there were 
occasional long periods of at least six months during which there were no renters in the 
residence. R. 123. Specifically, she knew there had been no renters during the last two 
10'"' 
years of Mrs. Done's life. R. 122. DeAnn Gardner presented testimony that she had 
been Mrs. Done's friend for 40 years and that her backyard bordered on Mrs. Done's. R. 
124. She described two periods of at least six months during which the basement was not 
rented out—in 2001 and again in 2003. Id. Mrs. Gardner related that Mrs. Done asserted 
in 2001 that her apartment was "grandfathered," but she also testified that in 2003 she 
confirmed with City staff that a nonconforming use would be deemed abandoned if 
unused for six months. Id. Mrs. Done's response was, "well, I don't really care whether 
I lose it or not, it's nice, I enjoy the privacy of not having anyone there, I don't care, it 
gives me the opportunity to let my grandchildren come and stay there if they need a place 
to stay so it really doesn't matter to me." R. 124-123. 
13. Other documents in the record also reflect period of non-rental, or at least lack of 
history. David Armond, the Wasatch Neighborhood Chair around the time of Petitioner's 
purchase of the residence, observed in an email that several neighbors helped a family 
move out of the basement in April 2004 and the basement had not been rented out 
between that time and March 2006. R. 75. Petitioner, in a letter addressed to Provo 
Mayor Lewis K. Billings, dated May 3, 2006, stated that "no one is sure at this time what 
the status has been since April of 2004," but also stated that the Third Owners had 
contracted to rent the apartment in December 2005, although they decided not to place 
the renters. R. 70. In a letter dated August 3, 2006, Petitioner stated that "the use of 
basement apartment has not been well documented." R. back of 25. 
14. During her purchase of the home, Petitioner dealt with the seller's realtor, John 
Wallace. R. back of 71. Mr. Wallace conveyed to Petitioner and her father that, at a 
minimum, there would be controversy and opposition associated with renting out the 
basement. R. 120:435-437; R. 120:448-454; R. 65. Petitioner understood she needed to 
comply with zoning laws, but she did not request a Zone Verification. R. 65. 
15. On March 1, 2006, Mr. Wallace requested a Zone Verification from Provo City staff. 
R. back of 63. 
16. On April 21, 2006, Petitioner bought the residence without having received a Zone 
Verification. R. 186; R. 65. On April 24, 2006, Provo City staff sent the requested Zone 
Verification to Mr. Wallace. R. 69. On that same date, Petitioner also obtained a letter 
from the Third Owners' daughter, Jeanine Gunn, regarding her knowledge of the history 
of the basement apartment, although Petitioner was not made aware of the Zone 
Verification until April 26, 2006. R. back of 67; R. 66; R. back of 71. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner's appeal should be denied both on the grounds that the Board of 
Adjustment's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal and that Petitioner's 
estoppel argument is barred and flawed. 
In order to successfully argue for reversal of the Board's decision, Petitioner must 
prove that there was not substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision. Petitioner 
claims a nonconforming use of a basement apartment for property and had the burden to 
demonstrate to the Board that this use existed prior to changes in zoning law that made 
the use illegal and that the nonconforming use has not been abandoned. The record 
shows first that the Board reviewed substantial evidence that the use did not exist prior to 
the 1954 zoning law. This evidence consisted of a building permit typical of single-
12 
family dwellings, statements from Toni Shain that there was no kitchen, and evidence 
demonstrating that any renters were likely boarders only. 
Substantial evidence also was reviewed by the Board sufficient to allow a 
reasonable person to conclude that if there had been a nonconforming use, it had been 
abandoned. This consisted of statements from several neighbors as to periods of non-use 
sufficient to raise a statutory presumption of abandonment and statements of the Third * 
Owner that she did not care about preserving any nonconforming use. In contrast to this, 
was presented only broad generalizations that over the years the basement had been 
rented out, unsupported by any detailed records. 
Petitioner also claims that the Board was estopped from making a determination 
that the apartment was illegal due to Petitioner's detrimental reliance on a twenty-two-
year-old case file notation. This claim fails for a number of reasons. First, it was not 
raised before the Board, and is, therefore, not properly raised here. Second, estoppel may 
generally not be invoked against government entities and this case does not meet the 
exceptional circumstances that allow exceptions to that rule. Third, the record 
demonstrates that the City did perform a clear and definitive act. Finally, the Petitioner 




I. THE BOARD'S DECISION WAS NOT CLEARLY ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL AS THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT AND PETITIONER DID NOT MEET HER 
BURDEN OF PROOF BEFORE THE BOARD. 
Appellant claims the Board of Adjustment's decision must be overturned on the 
basis that it is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal Appellant, has made no allegation that. 
the Board violated a specific law in reaching its decision. Therefore, her claim rests on 
the argument that the decision was arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
801(3)(d). As Petitioner notes, the Board's decision "can only be considered arbitrary or 
capricious if not supported by substantial evidence." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. The 
question before this Court then is "in light of the evidence before the Board, whether a 
reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the Board." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 
604. Petitioner has the burden to prove that a reasonable mind could not do so. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9a-705. 
A. There Are Only Two Relevant Questions of Fact to the Question of 
Whether Petitioner Has a Legal Nonconforming Use, 
Despite the length of the record there are only two findings of fact by the Board 
that are relevant to this appeal. In order to prove a valid nonconforming use, Petitioner 
needed to convince the Board that: (1) the, now nonconforming, use was established prior 
to the change in zoning laws that would make the use currently illegal; and (2) the 
nonconforming use, once established, has not been abandoned during the period since it 
was established. Provo City Code Chapter 14.36.040 and 14.36.090. 
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Because Petitioner is challenging the findings of fact of the Board, Petitioner has a 
duty to marshal the evidence. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 164 P.3d 384, 390 
(Utah 2007). Utah Rule App. Proc. 24(a)(9) states that "[a] party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." 
"[PJarties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court will 
decline, in its discretion, to review the [agency's] factual findings." Martinez, 164 P.3d 
at 390. As shown in the following sections, and by a comparison of the Statement of 
Facts in each brief, Petitioner has failed to meet this duty. Petitioner has consistently 
disparaged the evidence supporting Respondents' decision as being meager and unworthy 
of merit or consideration without fulfilling this duty to first marshal the evidence and then 
demonstrate why it may be insufficient. 
B. Substantial Evidence Was Presented That a Nonconforming Use Was 
Never Established. 
A review of the evidence presented to the Board shows that there was sufficient 
evidence to allow a reasonable mind to conclude that a nonconforming use of Petitioner's 
property was never established. The specific question is whether or not the residence at 
1295 Cedar Avenue was a legal two-family dwelling prior to 1954 when the zoning of 
that location changed to allow only single-family dwellings. The evidence before the 
Board regarding both the construction of the house and the use of the residence 
constitutes substantial evidence that it was not used as a two-family dwelling prior to 
1954. 
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1. Evidence regarding the manner of construction of the residence 
does not establish that it was a two-family dwelling. 
Petitioner attempted to convince the Board that the residence was originally 
constructed as a two-family dwelling. However, the evidence of this was meager at best 
and was contradicted by evidence to the contrary. 
Petitioner places great emphasis on the fact that the basement of the home was 
built with a separate entrance and may have had a sink and a bathroom. It is undisputed 
that the basement had a separate entrance. However, this fact has little real significance. 
As indicated by Mr. Christensen, the slope of the land in this area is such that it is 
possible to have a walkout basement on many of the lots in the area. R. back of 39. This 
is, in fact, the case. Seven other homes on the street have basements. R. back of 36. Of 
those seven, six have (or had at some point) a separate entrance to the basement. IcL The 
existence of such a door does not demonstrate the existence of an apartment. 
In fact, the significance of this fact is further decreased by the evidence before the 
Board that the upstairs and downstairs portions of the home were not completely 
separate. Ray Christensen testified that Edna Done (the Third Owner) had "regularly 
complained when she got into disputes with her renters, they were putting things in her 
storage area downstairs." R. 131. This indicates a connection between the two areas of 
the house. Andrew Gustafson, a neighbor and father of a close friend of Mrs. Done, also 
indicates that the division between the upstairs and the downstairs was not "definitive." 
R. 127. The only person who indicates the upstairs and downstairs were "completely 
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separate" is the son of the Second Owners who never lived in the house and whose 
parents only owned it for two years over forty years ago. R. back of 98 
Similarly, the presence of a bathroom and/or a sink, even if undisputed, does not 
establish the presence of an apartment. Many single-family homes have multiple 
bathrooms and there are a number of reasons to include a sink in the basement, the most 
common being to utilize it for laundry. The Board did in fact hear testimony that within 
the first year of purchasing the home, the Third Owners moved the laundry facilities as 
part of a remodel of the main floor kitchen and dining room. R. back of 60. Perhaps the 
laundry facilities were relocated from near the basement sink. 
However, it is not even clear that there was a basement sink or bathroom at the 
time the house was constructed. Mrs. Shain, the daughter of the original owners, told the 
Petitioner that she could not say whether there was a sink downstairs. R. back of 99. As 
to the presence of a bathroom, Petitioner quoted Mrs. Shain as saying that there was a 
bathroom and that she couldn't remember if there was a bathroom. R. back of 99; R. 
138:56-57. 
Petitioner did present evidence to the Board by means of an affidavit from a 
plumber who inspected the pipes and concluded that uall the plumbing for the bathroom 
and kitchen sink was installed at the time the house was built." R. back of 102. Based 
solely on the plumber's affidavit though, it is unclear precisely what this means. Since 
the inspection was of the piping, it is not clear whether he determined that the sink and 
bathroom fixtures were actually in place, or merely that the piping to which they are now 
connected was present. The latter conclusion is supported by Petitioner's admission 
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before the Board that she could not get an expert opinion on whether the kitchen sink was 
original. R. 136. Further, one Board member based on the pictures and his plumbing 
experience presented an alternate view. R. 117. Admittedly, the Board member does not 
appear to be a professional plumber and his testimony may not carry the same weight. 
But taken together with Mrs. Shain's statement that she did not remember a sink, this 
evidence could reasonably allow the Board to conclude that Petitioner did not meet her 
burden of proof. 
More to the point, regardless of the existence of a basement sink, the evidence 
clearly shows that there was not a kitchen. Mrs. Shain told three people, including 
Petitioner, that there was not a kitchen in the basement. In Petitioner's affidavit 
regarding her conversation with Mrs. Shain, she attempts to portray this as simply a 
failure of Mrs. Shain's memory. R. back of 99. However, in her testimony to the Board, 
Petitioner states that Mrs. Shain affirmatively did not believe there was a kitchen because 
she remembered her mother cooking for the renters in the basement on occasion. R. 138. 
The Board also heard evidence that the building permit for the residence was not 
consistent with Petitioner's assertion that it originated as a two-family dwelling. The 
building permit for this residence lists the building type as a "Dwelling." R. 270. The 
Board received evidence from multiple sources, including the Board Chair based on her 
many years of experience on the Board of Adjustment, that building permits from that 
time period that contemplated construction of a multi-family dwelling were typically 
explicit about the multi-family nature of the building, using terms such as "duplex" or 
"two-family dwelling." R. 114; R. 131; R. back of 37. Petitioner disparages this 
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evidence on the basis that she has not seen any such permits. Appellant's Opening Brief, 
at 22. However, she provides no contrary evidence and there is no reason to doubt the 
affirmations of the Board and staff members that their experience is as they claim it to be. 
2. Evidence regarding the use of the basement prior to 1954 does 
not establish that the house was a two-family dwelling. 
Petitioner claims that the basement of the house was used as a separate apartment 
prior to 1954. However, there is a near complete dearth of any evidence to this effect. 
The only evidence of the basement's use from any source is Mrs. Shain's statement that 
she remembers renters in the basement. R. back of 99; R. 38. A complete review of Mrs. 
Shain's statements indicates not the use of a basement apartment, but the presence in her 
parents' home of roomers or boarders. As discussed above, Mrs. Shain affirmatively 
states there was no kitchen in the basement and remembers her mother cooking for the 
basement renters. R. 138. When Mr. Christensen spoke with Mrs. Shain, she referred to 
the basement area as "sleeping rooms." R. 130. As Mr. Christensen testified, this was a 
common term in the 1950s used to indicate a "rooming" or "boarding" situation where 
renters (often BYU students) rented a room for sleeping that did not include formal 
cooking facilities. R. 130. 
The mere presence of renters, taken together with the definite evidence about the 
lack of a kitchen, at best establishes that the Original Owners had roomers or boarders, 
not an apartment. This is further supported by the absence of listings for a second family 
in the Pole & Cole Directories for this neighborhood all the way up to 1967. 
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3. Substantial evidence was also presented to justify the Board's 
rejection of Petitioner's contention that Provo City ratified an 
existing nonconforming use in 1984. 
By far the most contentious piece of evidence in the case is a two page document 
labeled Provo City Community Development Case File. R. 74. This record documents 
that on October 26, 1983 City staff inspected the residence at 1295 Cedar Ave as the 
result of a complaint that the residence had been made into two units and was being 
occupied by two families. Id This complaint is, in and of itself, interesting in that it 
shows that the City had no record of this being a two-family dwelling and that one or 
more of the neighbors believed that the separation of the house into two separate units 
had only recently occurred. The inspectors made contact with a tenant who confirmed 
the double occupancy. 
The file then indicates that a letter was sent to the owners on October 27, 1983, At 
some subsequent point, a letter was received from John Hansen, Jr., the son-in-law of the 
Third Owners. The text of this letter was entered into the Case File, presumably to 
preserve it, given Mr. Hansen's urging that the City record the information somehow. R. 
back of 74. The case file indicates no further action by anyone. No collection of 
evidence is documented and the spaces to indicate action by the Council, the Planning 
Commission, and the Board of Adjustment are all blank. 
The only additional data on the case file are (1) an indication that the "Comp 
Date," whatever that is, was June 29, 1984; (2) a notation that the status is "Closed"; and 
(3) the words "Conformed-Nonconforming." R. back of 74. Petitioner contends that this 
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enigmatic document is a clear statement that in 1984 the City documented a valid 
nonconforming use for the property in question. This contention strains credulity. How 
can a property be both conformed and nonconforming at the same time? If there is a 
nonconforming use, what is it? Is it a nonconforming apartment or a nonconforming 
right to boarders? Why would the author spend an entire paragraph detailing the nature 
of the complaint and two, mutually exclusive, words describing the complete abrogation 
of the current zoning ordinance in effect for the property? Why would the City not have 
sent a confirmation detailing such a decision to the property owner? Why would the 
property owner who saved letters dating back to the purchase of the house not save such a 
letter if one was sent? 
A number of hypotheses have been put forth regarding the meaning of this two 
word notation, some more likely than others: Was "confirmed" misspelled as 
"conformed"? Was it even actually a notation? Or is it the heading to a data field (like 
"Status") that never got filled in? Was the staff supposed to circle one? Or perhaps, did 
the notation generically signify that the case was closed successfully because the property 
either "conformed" (stopped the illegal use) or was "nonconforming"? 
Unfortunately, no one knows and the Board was not presented any evidence as to 
the definitive interpretation of the document. So based on its utter ambiguity, and the 
totality of the other evidence that there was not an existing nonconforming use, the Board 
decided not to view the case file notation as granting a nonconforming use. For instance, 
the Board received evidence that the Third Owners had engaged in a variety remodeling 
and construction projects with regard to the house since they moved in, the majority done 
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without a building permit. These included remodeling the main floor kitchen, adding a 
main floor formal dining room, building a carport and parking pad, some degree of 
"updating" the downstairs "kitchen;" and adding a second story (this last being the only 
project for which a building permit was obtained). R. 97; R. back of 60; R. 69; R. 90; R. 
back of 37. Such evidence would support a reasonable conclusion that Mrs. Done did 
not, in fact, have a prior nonconforming use and that she had been perhaps responsible 
for upgrading the, probably already illegal, use of the basement by boarders to a full 
apartment use. (It is interesting in this regard that the first time the neighborhood 
directories show an additional family in the home is in 1967, shortly after the Done 
family probably completed their remodeling projects given the 1966 building permit. R. 
107.) It would also, based on that analysis, support a rejection of Petitioner's view of the 
case file document. The Petitioner did not meet her burden of proof to convince the 
Board otherwise, and the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence. 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents submit that there was substantial evidence 
for the Board to make a finding of fact that the residence was not constructed as a two-
family dwelling nor used as one prior to 1954 and that the Third Owner, Mrs. Done, was 
not granted a nonconforming use by Provo City in 1984. 
C. Substantial Evidence Was Presented That, If a Nonconforming Use 
Was Established, It Was Abandoned. 
Even were the Court to find that the Board erred regarding the establishment of the 
nonconforming use, in order for her claim to succeed, Petitioner would also have to 
demonstrate that the right to a nonconforming apartment, once established, was never 
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abandoned. This she was unable to do before the Board and there is substantial evidence 
to support the Board's decision.1 There were three different owners of the residence prior 
to Petitioner. Petitioner presented scant evidence regarding the first two and, with regard 
to the third, substantial evidence supports a finding of abandonment.2 
1. There is little evidence to support Petitioner's contention that 
the first two owners continuously rented the basement 
Petitioner's only evidence that the Original Owners continuously rented the 
basement from 1954, when the zoning ordinance changed, until 1961, when they sold the 
property is general assertion of Mrs. Shain that she remembers renters in the basement. 
Mrs. Shain made no assertions and Petitioner presented no evidence as to the timeframe 
in which the basement was rented or the continuity of the rental. On the other hand, the 
Board received City staffs research showing no additional families listed in the home in 
the neighborhood directories for the entire period of the Original Owners's ownership. 
R. back of 68. (In fact, the directories don't show and additional families during the 
ownership of the Second Owners either. Id.) This supports the contention, discussed 
above, that when there were renters, they were merely boarders. 
The son of the Second Owners, Mr. Paulson, did submit a statement that there 
were students living in the basement "throughout the duration of [his] parent's ownership 
1
 And, as indicated earlier, Petitioner fails to marshal the evidence before attacking the 
Board's finding as she is required to do. 
2
 Petitioner contends that the Board did not make a finding of abandonment. The Report 
of Action does not contain a formal finding of abandonment as the finding that there was 
never a nonconforming use made that question moot. However, the Board's comments 
before ruling make it clear that the Board believed if the use had been established it 
would have been abandoned. R. 162-160. 
23 
of the home." R. back of 98. However, it is again likely that any such renters were 
merely boarders. Petitioner mentions that Mr. Paulson stated that there were at times up 
to four girls living in the basement. R. 138. She indicated that this seems "a little 
excessive" to her, but such a situation makes much more sense if viewed in the context of 
the "sleeping room" situation discussed above. R. 138. Mr. Paulson stated that there 
were cooking facilities in the basement. R. back of 98. However, he does not state what 
the cooking facilities were and he insists that his parents did not remodel the house. Id. 
Taken in light of Mrs. Shain's statement about there being no kitchen, it is likely 
that the cooking facilities mentioned by Mr. Paulson were minimal amenities installed by 
the roomers themselves, such as a portable hot plate. This is especially likely given that 
Mr. Paulson's knowledge is based only on visits to the home, as he never lived there, and 
the correspondence between Mr. Paulson's parents and the Third Owners regarding the 
ownership of personal property in the home. When negotiating the sale of the residence 
with the Third Owners, the Paulsons refer on several occasions to retaining possession of 
the "student furniture" in the basement, but whenever they talk about a kitchen or kitchen 
appliances, they refer only to the main floor kitchen. R. 79-back of 76. Whatever 
"cooking facilities" the students may have provided themselves, the record shows that the 
Paulsons never considered there to be a "kitchen" downstairs. 
So viewed in the light most favorable to the Petitioner, evidence regarding the use 
of the basement by the first two owners would establish only a right to have boarders, not 
a right to have an apartment. However, the Board has no obligation to view the evidence 
in such light. Rather the Petitioner has the burden to convince the Board that any 
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nonconforming use was not abandoned during this period and the scant evidence 
presented could reasonably be viewed as failing to meet that burden. 
2. Substantial evidence was presented that Mrs. Done abandoned 
any existing nonconforming use. 
Petitioner has raised a number of arguments claiming that a nonconforming use for 
a basement apartment existed at least until 1984; either because there was continuous 
nonconforming use up to that point or because the City issued a determination of 
nonconforming use in 1984. Those arguments have been refuted above. However, even 
if one or more of those arguments were accepted, Petitioner's claim still fails. It fails 
because the evidence shows that Mrs. Done abandoned any existing nonconforming use. 
Pursuant to Provo City Code 14.36.090(1) "any nonconforming structure or use which is 
not occupied or used for a continuous period of six (6) months shall be presumed 
abandoned and shall not thereafter be re-occupied or used." Abandonment is also 
presumed where an owner makes a public statement indicating an intent to abandon the 
use. Provo City Code 14.36.090(2). This presumption may be rebutted if the owner 
presents evidence showing no intent to abandon the use. Provo City Code 14.36.090(3). 
a) There were several lengthy periods where Mrs. Done did 
not rent out the basement. 
Several neighbors testified regarding periods during which the Third Owners were 
not renting out the basement. Andrew Gustafson, who lives two houses down the street, 
testified that Mrs. Done (the Third Owner) was his daughter's best friend and that he had 
personal knowledge that there were long periods of time during which she did not have 
people living in the basement. R. 125. Lisa Wygant, a next door neighbor since 1993, 
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indicated that there were occasional long periods of at least six months during which 
there were no renters in the residence. R. 123. She knew there had been no renters 
during the last two years of Mrs. Done's life. R. 122. DeAnn Gardner presented herself 
as Mrs. Done's friend for 40 years and stated that her backyard bordered on Mrs. Done's. 
R. 124. She described two periods of at least six months during which the basement was 
not rented out—in 2001 and again in 2003. Id. 
Other evidence in the record also reflects periods of non-rental or, at the very least, 
a lack of rental history. David Armond stated that several neighbors helped a family 
move out of the basement in April 2004 and the basement had not been rented out 
between that time and March 2006. R. 75. Petitioner, in a letter addressed to Provo 
Mayor Lewis K. Billings, dated May 3, 2006, stated that "no one is sure at this time what 
the status has been since April of 2004." R. 70. In a letter dated August 3, 2006, 
Petitioner also conceded that "the use of basement apartment has not been well 
documented." R. back of 25. 
The Board had not only substantial evidence, but undisputed evidence, that there 
was at least a period of over a year, from mid-2004 through January 2006, where the 
basement was not rented. There is also considerable evidence that this was not the only 
period of non-rental creating a presumption of abandonment. 
b) A presumption of abandonment also arises from Mrs. 
Done's public statement. 
Evidence also indicates that Mrs. Done manifested to others that she did notliave 
an intent to preserve the use. Mrs. Gardner related that Mrs. Done asserted in 2001 that 
26 
her apartment was "grandfathered," but she also testified that in 2003 she confirmed with 
City staff that a nonconforming use would be deemed abandoned if unused for six 
months. R. 124. Mrs. Done's response was, "well, I don't really care whether I lose it or 
not, it's nice, I enjoy the privacy of not having anyone there, I don't care, it gives me the 
opportunity to let my grandchildren come and stay there if they need a place to stay so it 
really doesn't matter to me." R. 124-123. 
c) Petitioner's claim that Mrs. Done had an ongoing intent to 
preserve the use during periods of non-use is not 
supported by the record. 
Petitioner claims that Mrs. Done did not intend to abandon any existing 
nonconforming use. Part of this claim centers on an assertion that Mrs. Done only failed 
to rent the basement due to ill health prior to her death. However, the record shows that 
this assertion, even if accurate during some periods, does not cover sufficient time 
periods to negate the presumption of abandonment. Jeanine Gunn, Mrs. Done's daughter, 
states that her mother was in ill health for the last year of her life and that this was the 
only reason the apartment was vacant. R. back of 75. Mrs. Done died in January of 
2006. IcL Even granting her an illness for the entire year of 2005, her illness does not 
cover the eight month period of non-use from April 2004 through the end of that year. R. 
75. Mr. Armond independently confirms this by stating that Mrs. Done's incapacitation 
did not occur until at least six months had passed while the basement was empty. Id. 
Further, Petitioner's argument does not cover the periods of non-use in 2001 and 2003 
testified to by the neighbors, as discussed above. 
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As a small side note, Petitioner has claimed repeatedly that her witnesses are 
unbiased and have nothing to gain while the neighborhood witnesses have an axe to 
grind. It seems appropriate to note here that Jeanine Gunn does in fact have a motive to 
assist Petitioner in getting the rental use of the property approved. If the illegality of the 
apartment is upheld, Mrs. Gunn, and perhaps other heirs of Mrs. Done, could quite 
possibly become Defendants in a claim by Petitioner that they, or their representatives, 
sold her the house without disclosing the nature and extent of the zoning controversy. 
In any event, Mrs. Done apparently did make some gesture to rent out the 
basement in December 2005, but then backed out. R. back of 75. Given the utter lack of 
evidence demonstrating any attempts between April 2004 and December 2005, this is at 
best an attempt to reacquire the use (probably based on the hope that it will never be 
recognized that it was abandoned) rather than an ongoing effort to avoid abandonment. 
Petitioner refers the Court to Caster v. West Valley City, 2001 UT App 220, 29 
P.3d 22 regarding the issue of intent to abandon. However, this case only strengthens 
Respondents' argument. In Caster, the court held that the property owner had no intent to 
abandon his right to a nonconforming use of the property as an auto wreckage and 
salvage yard because he had met the statutory requirement to continually maintain the 
nonconforming use. Id., at 23. The owner did this by obtaining annual business licenses 
for the property and storing vehicles on the property. Id., at 23-24. In the present case, 
the Board received no evidence that Mrs. Done attempted to maintain the nonconforming 
use other than one attempt to rent the basement nearly two years after the last occupants 
moved out. 
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II. THE CITY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING THE BOARD'S 
DECISION AS THIS ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, ESTOPPEL MAY 
NOT BE INVOKED AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTITES, AND THE 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT IT, 
A. Estoppel Was Not Raised Before the Board Either Specifically or to the 
"Level of Consciousness" Standard. 
Appellant's Brief claims that equitable estoppel is an issue presented in this case. 
"[A] party seeking review of agency action must raise an issue before that agency to 
preserve the issue for further review." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Company, 966 P.2d 
844, 847 (Utah 1998). In the present case, the first mention of the word "estoppel" 
occurs well into the District Court proceedings within Petitioner's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 305; R. 303-301. Petitioner failed to raise 
estoppel with any particularity even in its Petition for Review to the District Court. R. 6-
3. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that in agency decisions the same 
level of strict waiver analysis as in a trial court decision may be inappropriate. Badger, 
966 P.2d at 847. Therefore, the courts have applied a "level of consciousness" test 
"requiring a plaintiff to bring an issue to the fact finder's attention so that there is at least 
the possibility that it could be considered." Id. 
Appellant's Brief (at page 6) cites several portions of the record to assert that this 
issue was raised in the hearing before the Board. We here review those citations. 
Petitioner first claims estoppel was raised at R. 182:139 to 181:140-147. This refers to a 
portion of Petitioner's testimony before the Board. In this section, Petitioner refers to the 
Case File document (R. 74) and states "[a]s far as we're concerned this letter that says 
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"conformed nonconforming back in 1983 was the last that was ever said on it from the 
City and we read that to say that it was definitely nonconforming at that time." R. 181: 
144-146. This sentence refers in the present tense to Petitioner's view of the document at 
the time of the hearing. It does so in the context of arguing that the Board should find a 
nonconforming use now because there was, allegedly, a finding of nonconforming use in 
1983 and the relevant owner then, allegedly, had renters continuously until 2004. 
Nowhere in this section does Petitioner say that she had that understanding of the 
document prior to purchasing the house, that she relied upon it in her decision to buy the 
house, or even that she definitely had the document before buying the house. 
Petitioner next claims the issue was raised at R. 186:44-46. The only apparently 
relevant text here is: "And one of the great things about the home was the basement 
apartment, that it looked like, from all the evidence we had heard, it had been used for 
students and should be able to be used for that in the future." Nothing in the phrase 
indicates specific knowledge of the case file document and any action on the part of the 
City. It only vaguely infers that Petitioner relied upon her own research of the issue. 
Petitioner then cites R. 167:449-454 in her support. In this testimony, Petitioner's 
father asserted to the Board that: 
indeed we had a conversation with the realtor at the time that the home was 
purchased. Alicia asked a lot of questions, Alicia looked in the city's files 
as a matter of fact, found the conformed and nonconforming letter. Alicia 
in fact knew that there would be controversy, knew that there would be 
opposition, I think the realtor was very clear on that. The realtor did at no 
time state that in his opinion the basement apartment was not legally 
nonconforming, in fact it was our conclusion after looking at what we had 
for evidence that it was. 
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Here again there is no clear mention of detrimental reliance of City action. The case file 
document is again mentioned but only in the general context of having been seen by 
Petitioner during her research. No assertion is made that this is the document she relied 
on in purchasing her home. It is not even clear from the statement when exactly the 
research was done, only that it was "at the time the home was purchased." Id 
Finally, Petitioner relies on R. back of 276:2-5, which states: "In this case, it is ' 
clear that the concept of a nonconforming use was inserted in the ordinance to avoid 
unnecessary, unwarranted, and unfair treatment of those who have acquired property in 
reliance upon its historical use and qualification in the absence of notice to the contrary." 
This citation does at least contain the word "reliance." However, it is in the context of 
relying on how past owners of the land have used it. The paragraph then goes on to 
summarize the standard of substantial evidence. R. back of 276. This argument follows 
a discussion of the case file document, but only in the context that the Board should find 
a current nonconforming use based on the argument that such a determination had 
previously been made when Mrs. Done was the owner. 
A review of the entire record presented to the Board makes clear that Petitioner's 
discussion of the case file document was only ever as part of an overarching argument 
that the evidence as a whole supported that Mrs. Done had possessed a right to a 
nonconforming use. To the extent that the record ever even infers that Petitioner "relied" 
upon something in purchasing the home, it is only the general categories of the research 
she did or the evidence she viewed as a whole that she might be perceived to be relying 
upon. The Board members5 reaction clearly illustrates this, as the only person the 
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members viewed as having a possible claim to rely on the case file document was Mrs. 
Done. R. 162:543-550; R. 161:580-162:584. 
Petitioner's father wrote a letter to the Community Development Staff Coordinator 
shortly before the Board hearing laying out his understanding of the issues. Estoppel, or 
even an allusion to it, appears nowhere in it. R. 103 and back. Finally, while this was not 
before the Board, Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment before Judge Howard is interesting in trying to determine how to interpret 
Petitioner's claim of issue preservation. In that Memorandum, dated February 28, 2007, 
Petitioner states: 
Before closing on the house, Petitioner reviewed many documents, 
and came away with the distinct understanding that she would be able to 
rent the lower portion of the house because it was a legal non-conforming 
use. While Petitioner does not remember the specific document that caused 
this understanding, it likely was the City's case file document in question. 
Regardless, Petitioner relied upon the representations of the previous 
owners who said they had rented out the apartment and who understood 
that they had a legal nonconforming basement apartment. R. 301 
(emphasis added). 
This statement completely undercuts Petitioner's entire estoppel argument, at least 
against the City. Petitioner then attempts to resurrect the argument by rather 
tenuously asserting that the previous owners probably relied on the case file 
document, so perhaps Petitioner's reliance on the previous owners would be kind 
of like relying on the City. At a minimum this argument fails because there is no 
evidence the previous owners ever saw the case file document. 
3
 Note this in reference to the potential bias of Jeanine Gunn mentioned at I.C.(2)(c), 
supra. 
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As indicated above, Petitioner did eventually raise the issue of estoppel at 
the District Court. R. 341-340. The District Court mentioned that the argument 
had been raised in its ruling, but did not specifically rule on it. This may have 
been either because of the Court's finding that the case file document did not mean 
what Petitioner claimed and therefore could not have been reasonably relied upon 
or because the Court recognized that the issue was not properly before it. In any 
event, Petitioner raised the issue much too late and the District Court's failure to 
address it is irrelevant as the issue was not properly before it. 
In short, Petitioner may have concluded that the residence has a 
nonconforming apartment before she bought it, but she never raised facts or 
arguments before the Board that would allow it to become conscious of or 
consider an argument that she specifically relied to her detriment on a City action. 
Thus, the estoppel issue is not properly preserved for review by this Court. 
B. Petitioner May Not Invoke Estoppel Against a Governmental Entity. 
Even if Petitioner's vague references to the case file document constitute an 
argument of detrimental reliance upon it, Petitioner's claim of equitable estoppel is 
barred as a matter of law as it may not be invoked against a governmental entity. Terry. 
157 P.3d at 365 (citing Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 
1992). There is a limited exception to this rule if "the facts may be found with such 
certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." 
Utah State Univ. of Agric. & Applied Sci. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 
1982). Petitioner's own cited estoppel case is a prime example where this Court rejected 
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an argument of estoppel despite the fact that prior to enforcing a zoning ordinance against 
the Defendant, the town of Alta had affirmatively granted Defendant three business 
licenses for a total of twenty-four months. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 
797. 802 (Utah App. 1992). To claim estoppel against Respondents for a zoning law 
decision, Petitioner must show that the "circumstances are exceptional." Id., at 803. 
1. Estoppel does not arise because there was no clear and definitive 
act by the city with respect to the Petitioner. 
Petitioner asserts that the City performed a clear and definitive act, which the 
Petitioner then relied on to her detriment, but it very unclear what that act was. Petitioner 
treats the case file document as if it were a formal memo issued by the City to all persons 
interested in knowing about the legal uses of 1295 Cedar Ave. In fact, the document is a 
two paragraph, twenty-three-year-old, internal memo that makes no affirmation as to the 
property in question except that the document ends with two printed words that make 
little, if any, sense when taken together. There is no evidence that the City ever provided 
this document to Mrs. Done or her family when she owned the property. The document 
was certainly not issued to Petitioner as a declaratory statement. It's not even clear from 
the record how, or when, Petitioner got the document. (The Provo City's Community 
Development Department Request for Records Log for 2006 show requests for records 
by Alicia Vial on July 3, 2006 and August 9, 2006, but nothing before that. See 
Addendum, Exhibit B) Petitioner never claims to have told City personnel that she was 
considering purchasing the property. In fact, as discussed below, Petitioner claims to 
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have done everything possible to understand the status of the property, except the one 
thing she reasonably should have done—ask the governing body! 
As discussed in detail in I.B.(3), supra, the document itself is not clear. Even if it 
were, it is hard to understand how to construe that the City engaged in a clear and 
definitive act when Petitioner obtained on her own a document not addressed to, or 
intended for, her without any knowledge on the City's part why she even wanted it. This 
clearly does not constitute exceptional circumstances or facts that can be found with 
sufficient certainty to overcome the bar to raising estoppel in this case. For that matter, it 
doesn't even meet the necessary elements of estoppel if the claim were not barred. 
2. Estoppel does not arise because the Petitioner did not reasonably 
rely upon an act by the City, 
As discussed at length in II.A., supraJ there is no indication in the record before 
the Board that Petitioner actually relied upon the case file document in reaching her 
decision to purchase this property. We note here that where Appellant's Brief quotes the 
record in support of Petitioner's reliance (page 12), Petitioner changes the tense of the 
sentence from present to past to bolster their reliance argument contrary to the contents of 
the record. SeeR. 182:139 to 181:140-147. In short, Petitioner's claim that she bought 
this property in reliance upon a two-word statement in an old City case file arose only 
several months after both the purchase of the house and the Board's determination of her 
appeal. Petitioner has admitted that she was advised by the realtor that there was 
controversy surrounding the use of the property and that she had a responsibility to 
comply with and investigate the governing zoning laws. R. 120; R. 65. Her response to 
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that information was to gather evidence of past use from prior owners and not to request 
an opinion from Provo City. She may have run across the case file document prior to 
purchasing the house and decided that it strengthened her case. However, taken together 
her actions indicate that not only did she not rely on the City's input in buying the house,, 
but intentionally avoided it. 
The following facts are illustrative of this conclusion. Petitioner closed on the 
house on April 21, 2006. R. 186. On April 26, 2006 she received notice of the City's 
Zone Verification. R. back of 71. This Verification was not requested by her and she 
states that she was unaware that it had even been requested prior to April 26, 2006. Id. 
Yet when she later contested the Zone Verification, she provided City staff with a 
statement from the previous owner's daughter on April 24, 2006. R. back of 67. If she 
had reviewed the City's case file document prior to purchase and determined prior to 
purchase that the City would definitely recognize the nonconforming use of the property 
and decided to go ahead with the purchase in reliance on that determination, then why 
was she collecting letters regarding the use of the basement three days after she bought 
the house, but two days before she knew anything about the Zone Verification? If she 
was sufficiently concerned to continue investigating, why didn't she approach the City 
for an opinion? 
Nevertheless, even if Petitioner did make her decision based on the case file 
document, that reliance was unreasonable for a multitude of reasons. Many have been 
raised above, such as a mass of evidence showing that Petitioner knew the renting of the 
apartment was controversial, but we mention one final one here. The document in 
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question was twenty-two-years-old when Petitioner purchased the house. How, by any 
sense of the word, would it be reasonable to rely on a two word notation in a twenty-two-
year-old file when making such an important decision? Especially when the file itself 
indicates that the question is one of frequent controversy? 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and arguments, Appellees, Provo City and the Provo 
City Board of Adjustment, respectfully request that this Court uphold the decision of the 
Board of Adjustment and deny Petitioner's claim for a nonconforming use related to the 
property located at 1295 Cedar Ave, Provo, Utah. 
DATED this 15th day of February, 2008. 
X B R I A N J O N p ^ 
Attorney for Appellees 
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(5) A fee as shown on the Consolidated Fee Schedule adopted 
by the Municipal Council shall be required for each event at a specific 
location, and three hundred (300) dollar bond shall be posted for each 
event and each location. 
(6) Liability insurance in the amount of $1,000,000 for personal 
injury, $3,000,000 per event showing Provo City as an additional 
insured shall be required. 
(7) A hold harmless and indemnity agreement shall be signed by 
the permit holder. 
(8) Special events may be held in an agricultural zone subject to 
specific site approval. 
(9) A special event permit may be canceled if it is determined by 
staff that the use is detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of the 
community at the location specified on the permit. 
(Enacted 1992-40, Am 2006-15, Am 2007-11) 
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14.36.010. Purpose. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to establish regulations governing 
legally established lots, structures, uses and other nonconformities 
that do not conform to applicable requirements of this Title. They may 
continue to exist and be put to productive use, but their nonconforming 
aspects shall be regulated as provided in this Chapter. The intent of 
this Chapter is to recognize the interests of property owners while 
controlling expansion of nonconforming conditions. (Rep&ReEn 2002-
05) 
14.36.020. Scope. 
The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to all lots, structures, 
uses and other nonconformities within the City regardless of when 
the nonconformity was established. Any lot, structure, use or other 
circumstance governed by this Title which does not conform to the 
provisions of this Title may be continued to the extent that it was 
legally established and complies with applicable provisions of this 
Chapter. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05) 
14.36.030. Change in Nonconforming Status. 
A nonconforming lot, structure, use or other nonconformity may 
not be changed except in conformance with the provisions of this 
Title. Whenever any nonconforming use is changed to a less intensive 
nonconforming use, such use shall not be changed back to a more 
intensive nonconforming use. Whenever any nonconforming use is 
changed to a conforming use, such use shall not later be changed to a 
nonconforming use. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05) 
14.36.040. Nonconforming Uses. 
(1) Continuation. A nonconforming use which was legally 
existing when such use became prohibited may be continued as 
provided in this section and by any other applicable provision of this 
Chapter, so long as it remains otherwise lawful, subject to applicable 
standards and limitations in this Chapter. 
(2) Expansion Within Conforming Building. A nonconforming 
use existing within a portion of a conforming building may not be 
expanded. 
(3) Expanding and Altering Nonconforming Uses of Land and 
Structures. No nonconforming use may be moved, enlarged or altered 
and no nonconforming use of land may occupy additional land, except 
as provided in this Section. 
(a) A nonconforming use may not be enlarged, expanded or 
extended to occupy all or a part of another structure or site, that 
it did not occupy on January 1, 2002. 
(b) A structure containing a nonconforming use may not be -
moved unless the use shall thereafter conform to the regulations 
of the zoning district into which the structure is moved. Prior to 
moving any building, the applicant shall make application, and 
go through the process set forth in Chapter 14.40, Provo City 
Code. 
(4) Nonconforming Use of Open Land. A nonconforming use of 
open land may be continued provided such nonconforming use shall 
not be expanded or extended into any building or open land, except 
as may be required by law. 
(5) Expamsion of Outdoor Nonconforming Uses. A 
nonconforming use of a lot where the principal use is not enclosed 
within a building, such as a salvage yard or a motor vehicle sales lot, 
shall not be expanded except in conformity with the requirements of 
this Title. 
(6) Restoration. A nonconforming use in a conforming structure 
damaged by fire, wind, tornado, earthquake, or other natural disaster 
or calamity may be restored as it existed previously and its use may 
be continued so long as restoration is complete within one (1) year. 
(Rep&ReEn 2002-05, Am 2003-43) 
14.36.050. Nonconforming Structures. 
(1) Continuation. A nonconforming structure in any zone may 
be continued as provided in this Section and any other applicable 
provision of this Chapter so long as no additions or enlargements are 
made thereto and no structural alterations are made therein, except 
as provided in this Section or as may be required by law. If any 
nonconforming structure is removed from the lot where it was located 
each future structure thereon shall conform to applicable provisions 
of this Title. 
(2) Maintenance and Repair. A nonconforming structure may 
be maintained. Repairs and structural alterations may be made to 
a nonconforming structure within the existing footprint thereof 
provided that trie degree of nonconformity is not increased. 
(3) Expansion and Enlargement. Any expansion of a 
nonconforming structure that increases the degree of nonconformance 
is prohibited except as provided in this Subsection or as may 
be required by law. An existing one-family dwelling which is 
nonconforming as to height, area, or yard regulations may be added to 
or enlarged if the addition or enlargement conforms with applicable 
requirements of this Title. Provided, however, that such a dwelling 
which is nonconforming as to side yard requirements but having a 
minimum side yard of not less than three (3) feet, may be extended 
along the nonconforming building line to the extent of one-half 
(Vi) the length of the existing dwelling if such extension is for the 
purpose of enlarging and maintaining the existing dwelling unit in 
the structure, and provided such enlargement conforms to ail other 
regulations of the zone in which the dwelling is located. 
(4) Relocation. If a nonconforming structure is relocated within 
the City, it shall be located in a manner which fully conforms with 
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applicable requirements of this Title, including the procedures set 
forth in Chapter 14.40, Provo City Code. 
(5) Restoration. A nonconforming structure damaged by fire, 
wind, tornado, earthquake, or other natural disaster or calamity may 
be restored as it existed previously and its use may be continued so 
long as restoration is complete within one (1) year. (Rep&ReEn 2002-
05) 
14.36.060. Nonconforming Lots. 
(1) Continuation. A nonconforming lot may continue to be 
occupied and used although it may not conform in every respect with 
the dimensional requirements of this Title, subject to the provisions 
of this Section and any other applicable provision of this Chapter. 
(2) Residential Zones. A new dwelling may be constructed on 
a legally established lot which is nonconforming as to area, frontage 
and/or width provided the dwelling conforms to all other requirements 
of this Title and other applicable codes. 
(3) Nonresidential Zones. A new building may be constructed on 
a legally established lot which is nonconforming as to area, frontage 
and/or width provided the building conforms to all other requirements 
of this Title and other applicable codes. 
(4) Lot with Existing Building or Structure. If a nonconforming 
lot contains a legally established structure the owner may continue 
the legal use of such structure and may expand the structure so long 
as the expansion conforms to applicable requirements of this Title. 
(5) Accessory Buildings. Accessory buildings customarily 
incidental to a main building or structure may be constructed on a 
nonconforming lot provided the accessory building and its location on 
the lot meets all other applicable building and zoning requirements. 
(Rep&ReEn 2002-05) 
14.36.070. Other Nonconformities. 
(1) Application and Intent. This Section shall apply to any 
other circumstance which does not conform to the requirements of 
this Title including, but not limited to, fence height or location; lack 
of buffers or screening; lack of or inadequate landscaping; lack of 
or inadequate off-street parking; and any other nonconformity not 
covered by Sections 14.36.040, 14.36.050, and 14.36.060 of this 
Chapter. Because the nonconformities regulated by this Section 
involve less investment and are more easily corrected than those 
regulated by Sections 14.36.030, 14.36.040, and 14.36.050 of this 
Chapter, the intent of the City is to eliminate such nonconformities as 
quickly as practicable. The degree of such nonconformities shall not 
be increased. 
(2) Nonconforming Development with Approved Site Plan. Any 
nonconforming development which is governed by an approved site 
plan shall be deemed to be in conformance with this Title to the extent 
such development conforms to the plan. 
(3) Compliance Required. Except as provided in Subsection (4), 
a nonconformity other than one enumerated in Sections 14.36.040, 
14.36.050, and 14.36.060 of this Chapter shall be brought into 
conformance upon the occurrence of any one of the following: 
(a) Any action which increases the floor area of the premises 
by more than thirty percent (30%). 
(b) Any action which, when combined with one (1) or more 
previous expansions that have occurred over a period of time, 
causes the aggregate area of expansion to exceed thirty percent 
(30%) of the original floor area of the premises. 
(c) For a lot located in a commercial or industrial zone, any 
change in use to a more intensive use when a new certificate of 
occupancy is required. 
(4) This Section shall not apply to property located in the CBD 
zone. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05, Am 2003-43) 
14.36.080. Nonconformities Resulting From Public Action. 
When area or yard setbacks of a legally established lot are 
reduced as the result of conveying land to a federal, state or local 
government for a public purpose, such lot and yards shall be deemed 
to be in compliance with the minimum lot size and yard setback 
standards of this Title without any need for a variance. (Rep&ReEn 
2002-05) 
14.36.090. Abandonment of Nonconforming Structure or Use. 
(1) Presumption of Abandonment by Passage of Time. Any 
nonconforming structure or use which is not occupied or used for 
a continuous period of six (6) months shall be presumed abandoned 
and shall not thereafter be re-occupied or used except in a manner 
that conforms to the requirements of this Title unless the presumption 
of abandonment is overcome as provided in Subsection (3) of this 
Section. 
(2) Presumption of Abandonment by Event. Independent of the 
six (6) month requirement set forth in Subsection (1) of this Section, 
a nonconforming structure or use shall be presumed abandoned when 
any of the following events occur: 
(a) The owner has in writing or by public statement indicated 
intent to abandon the structure, use or other nonconformity 
(b) A less intensive use has replaced the original 
nonconforming use; 
(c) The owner has physically changed the structure or its 
permanent equipment in a way that reduces or eliminates the 
nonconformity; or 
(d) The structure has been removed through applicable 
procedures for the abatement or condemnation of unsafe 
structures. 
(3) Overcoming Presumption of Abandonment. A presumption of 
abandonment may be rebutted upon evidence presented by the owner 
showing no intent to abandon the structure or use. Such evidence 
may include proof that during the alleged period of abandonment the 
owner has done either of the following: 
(a) Maintained the structure or use, if any, in accordance 
with the applicable codes; or 
(b) Has actively and continuously attempted to sell or lease 
the property where the structure or use is located. (Rep&ReEn 
2002-05) 
14.36.100. Determination of Nonconforming Status - Effect of 
Determination. 
(1) Procedure. The Zoning Administrator, or the Administrator's 
designee, shall determine the existence, expansion, or modification 
of a nonconforming lot, structure, use or other nonconformity as 
provided in the following procedure: 
(a) If a determination of the nonconforming status of 
a property is desired, the owner or his designee shall make 
application for a Zone Verification with the Department of 
Community Development. The Zoning Administrator shall then 
investigate the factual and legal history of the subject property 
and shall thereafter make a determination of nonconforming 
status of the property. 
(b) Notice of the determination of nonconforming status 
shall be mailed to the owners of the subject property, and to the 
chair of the neighborhood where the property is located. 
(c) If within ten (10) days after notice is mailed, information 
is received by the Zoning Administrator which may affect the 
validity of the determination, the Administrator may make an 
amended determination. Notice of an amended determination 
shall be given as set forth in Subsection (b) of this Section. 
(d) The notice shall include a statement that any 
determination may be appealed to the Board of Adjustment as 
provided in Chapter 14.05 of this Title and shall state the date by 
which the appeal must be filed. 
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(2) Burden of Proof. In all cases, the property owner shall 
have the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that a 
lot, structure, use or other circumstance which does not conform 
to the provisions of this Title complied with applicable ordinance 
requirements in effect when the nonconforming circumstance was 
established. 
(a) A preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more 
credible and convincing than evidence offered in opposition to 
it. 
(b) Evidence offered to prove a lot, structure, use, or other 
circumstance was legally established may include, but is not 
limited to: 
(i) The date when the circumstance was created; 
(ii) Copies of applicable zoning, building, or other 
code provisions in effect at the time of creation; 
(iii) Documents showing the nonconforming 
circumstance was authorized such as building permits, 
letters, and meeting minutes of governmental bodies where 
the circumstance was discussed and/or authorized; 
(iv) Property inspection reports which indicate the 
degree that the nonconforming circumstance complies with 
applicable codes in effect at the time of creation; and 
(v) Affidavits of persons with personal knowledge of 
the circumstances of creation. 
(c) If no provision of a previously applicable zoning 
ordinance would have allowed a claimed nonconforming 
circumstance, it shall be prima facie evidence that it was not 
legally established. 
(d) If when established, a lot, structure, use or other 
circumstance did not conform to the provisions of applicable 
zoning or other code provisions, the fact that it has been 
occupied, used, or existed for a considerable period of time shall 
not be a factor in determining whether the circumstance should 
be deemed legally established. 
(3) Abatement or Compliance. If a property owner is unable 
to demonstrate that a lot, structure, use or other nonconforming 
circumstance was legally established, it shall be deemed illegal and 
shall be abated or brought into conformance with applicable provisions 
of this Title. Abatement or compliance shall be achieved within thirty 
(30) days, unless the work which must be undertaken to achieve 
compliance cannot be accomplished in that time period. In such case 
the owner of the property shall enter into a legally binding agreement 
wherein the owner agrees to a schedule to achieve conformity as soon 
as reasonably practicable, so long as compliance is achieved within 
six (6) months. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05, Am 2002-32) 
14.36.110. Residential Structures Originally Constructed as a 
One-family Dwelling - Status Determination. 
(1) Purpose. In addition to other applicable provisions of this 
Chapter, the provisions of this Section shall be applied to determine 
whether a residential structure originally constructed as a one-family 
dwelling, but not presently occupied as such, should be deemed a 
nonconforming structure or use, or both. 
(2) Building Permit Record. If necessary building permits were 
issued authorizing one (1) or more units in the dwelling in addition to 
the original dwelling unit and construction was substantially completed 
pursuant to such permits, the issuance of such permits shall be prima 
facie evidence that the structure and use are nonconforming. 
(3) No Building Permit Record. If no building permits exist, a 
determination of nonconformity shall be made pursuant to Subsections 
(a) and (b) below. 
(a) A determination shall be made as to whether a dwelling 
unit substantially conforms to applicable zoning and building 
code requirements in effect when the additional dwelling unit 
was established, particularly those requirements set forth in 
Section 14.36.130 of this Chapter. Such determination shall 
include a physical inspection of the premises by the Chief 
Building Official or his designee. 
(i) If substantial conformance with applicable codes is 
found, the nonconforming circumstance shall be deemed 
legally established. 
(ii) If substantial conformance is not found, the illegal 
aspects of the structure and use shall be abated or brought 
into compliance with applicable zoning and building code 
requirements in effect when the additional dwelling unit 
was established, except as provided in Section 14.36.130 
of this Chapter. 
(b) The presence of an interior connection between upper, 
lower, or adjoining portions of a structure originally constructed 
as a one-family dwelling shall create a presumption that only one 
dwelling unit was originally authorized, unless the connection -
was obviously originally constructed as a vestibule, lobby, 
or passage way between dwelling units in the structure. Any 
evidence that the dwelling units were legally created, including 
but not limited to information listed in Section 14.36.100(2)(b) 
of this Chapter, shall be submitted to the Zoning Administrator 
to aid in making this determination. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05) 
14.36.120. Multiple-Family Dwellings and Apartment Complexes 
Constructed Prior to 1974 - Status Determination. 
(1) A project consisting of one or more multiple-family dwellings 
or apartment buildings constructed prior to January 1, 1974, which is 
located in a zone where the apartments, as presently existing, are not 
permitted shall be deemed nonconforming so long as the apartments 
in the complex: 
(a) Were originally constructed substantially as presently 
existing; 
(b) Were not originally constructed and occupied as one-
family dwellings and later converted to multiple-family or 
apartment dwellings. 
(c) Are all owned by the same individual, association, firm, 
partnership, or other legal entity; and 
(d) Are managed by a property manager, or management 
company in Provo City. 
(2) The owner of an apartment complex which meets the 
requirements of Subsection (1) may request a zoning verification from 
the Community Development Department If after due investigation, 
the Department determines by a preponderance of evidence that 
the building conforms to the requirements of Subsection (1), the 
name, address and a statement of the characteristics of the apartment 
building shall be added to an official list of such apartment complexes 
maintained by the Community Development Department. Upon 
determining that an apartment complex should be added to the list, 
the Department shall send a letter to the owner of the complex and 
the chair of neighborhood where the building is located stating the 
Department's findings and decision. During regular business hours 
the list shall be made available to the public upon request. (Rep&ReEn 
2002-05) 
14.36.130. Termination of Nonconforming Uses. 
(1) An illegal nonconforming use shall be terminated immediately 
without regard to this Section. 
(2) This Section shall apply to any present or future legal 
nonconforming use located in the Wasatch Neighborhood regardless 
of how created and includes, but is not limited to, a nonconforming 
use created by City legislative or administrative action, a Board of 
Adjustment decision, a judicial decision, settlement of a zoning 
enforcement matter, an agreement with Provo City, an error by the 
City, and any previously existing provision of this Title. 
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(3) Pursuant to the provisions of this Section any nonconforming 
use located in the Wasatch Neighborhood, described in Subsection (8) 
of this Section, shall be terminated: 
(a) by January 2, 2010, if such use was legally existing 
prior to January 2, 2007, or 
(b) within three (3) years after the date when such use 
became legally nonconforming, if legally created on or after 
January 2, 2007. 
(c) January 2, 2007 shall be the termination start date for a 
legal, nonconforming use in existence prior to January 2, 2007. 
The termination start date for any nonconforming use created 
on or after January 2, 2007 is the date when such use became 
legally nonconforming. 
(4) The Community Development Director or the Director's 
designee shall grant an owner of property affected by Subsection 
14.36.130(3) an extension of the time required to conform with such 
section if: 
(a) the owner: 
(i) by six (6) months after the termination start date 
files a notice of intent to apply for a time extension as 
provided in this Section; and 
(ii) by one (1) year after the termination start date files 
a complete application for an extension of time as provided 
in this Section, and 
(b) the owner"s application for an extension of time 
demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the nonconforming use which is the subject of the 
application was legally established; and 
(ii) subject to the formula in Subsection (5) of this 
Section, the owner is unable to recover prior to three (3) 
years after the termination start date the amount of the 
owner's investment in the property. 
(5) (a) The time period during which an owner may recover 
the amount of investment in property affected by Section 
14.36.130(3) of this Section shall be determined by dividing the 
residual value of the property by the average monthly net rental 
income from the property. The resulting figure is the number of 
months which the owner shall have to recover the investment in 
the property. 
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection the following 
definitions shall apply: 
(i) "Amount of the owner's investment" means the 
adjusted present value of a property as of the termination 
start date. 
(ii) "Adjusted present value" means a property's 
original purchase price plus any capital improvements and 
less depreciation and net income from the property, all as 
adjusted for inflation to the termination start date. 
(iii) "Compliance value" means the appraised value 
of the property on the termination start date assuming the 
nonconforming use is terminated. 
(iv) "Residual value" means the difference between a 
property's adjusted present value and its compliance value 
as of the termination start date. 
(c) The time period determined under Subsection (5)(a) 
of this Section shall apply to the property for which the owner 
made an application for an extension of time and to the owner's 
successors, if any, until such time period has run. 
(6) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Community 
Development Director or the Director's designee applying this Section 
may appeal such decision to the Board of Adjustment as provided in 
Chapter 14.05 of this Title. 
(7) The Community Development Director may adopt reasonable 
regulations to carry out the purpose of this Section. 
(8) The boundary of the Wasatch Neighborhood is shown on 
the Official Neighborhood Map adopted by the Municipal Council 
pursuant to Section 2.29.010(1), Provo City Code, and is described 
as follows: commencing at 1900 North and 1200 East; thence east 
on 1900 North to Oak Lane; thence east on Oak Lane to 1400 East; 
thence south on 1400 East to 820 North; thence west on 820 North 
to 1350 East; thence northwest from 1350 East (connecting to Birch 
Lane) to 900 East; thence north on 900 East to just north of Fir Circle 
(1500 North), thence northwest from 1500 North (connecting to Fir 
Ave.) to approximately 1200 East and 1700 North; thence north from 
the intersection of 1200 East and 1700 North to approximately 1900 
North and 1200 East. (Enacted 2007-01) 
14.36.140. Billboards Exempt. 
The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to billboards. 
Nonconforming billboards shall be terminated in accordance with 
applicable provisions of Section 10-9-407 and 10-9-408, Utah Code 
Annotated. In the event such provisions are repealed, nonconforming 
billboards shall be subject to the provisions of this Chapter. (Rep&ReEn 
2002-05) 
14.36.150. Appeals. 
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Zoning Administrator 
or other official enforcing the provisions of this Chapter may appeal 
for relief therefrom to the Board of Adjustment as provided in this 
Title. Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Adjustment 
enforcing the provisions of this Chapter may appeal to the District 
Court as provided in Section 14.05.050 of this Title. (Rep&ReEn 2002-
05) 














Permanent Parking to be Provided. 
Continuing Obligation. 
Nonconforming Facilities. 
Reduction in Parking Requirements. 
Parking Spaces Required. 
Parking Requirements for Uses Not Specified. 
General Provisions. 
Required Improvements and Maintenance. 
Parking Design Standards. 
Handicapped Parking Spaces. 
Notice of Parking and Occupancy Restrictions. 
14.37.010. Off-Street Parking. 
The number of off-street parking spaces required in connection 
with any particular land use shall be not less than that set forth in this 
Chapter, except for permitted reductions allowed under the provisions 
of Section 14.37.070, Provo City Code. 
14.37.020. Permanent Parking to be Provided. 
Every building structure, improvement, or use hereafter 
constructed, reconstructed, or enlarged, shall be provided with 
permanently maintained parking spaces as specified in this Chapter 
for the area of said construction, reconstruction, or enlargement. (Am 
1995-22) 
14.37.030. Continuing Obligation. 
The required off-street parking facilities shall be a continuing 
obligation of the property owner so long as the use requiring vehicle 
parking or vehicle loading facilities continues. It shall be unlawful 
for any owner of any building or use to discontinue or dispense with 
EXHIBIT B 
Provo City Community Development Department, 
Request for Records Log for 2006 











































| 535 No. 400 E. & 660 No. 200 E. 
CUP staff requirements for AT&T site 
J @ 1330 East 300 North/Seven Peaks 
756 East Walnut Street 
2440 N. 750 East 
333 West 1300 North 
1130 East Ridge Road 
946 Cedar 
2431 North 750 East 
745 East 2320 North 
368 East 200 North 
1141 West 650 North 
258 North 700 East 
2043 South Mountain Vista Ln. 
428 West 4150 North 
1366 East 1120 South 
3751 No. Timpview Drive 
710-716 North 490 West | 
158 South 400 East | 










































































































364 East 200 South 
383 North 400 East 
350 East 400 North 
300 North 1450 East 
519/521 East 200 South 
qqwetru[\][poyue487 South 1330 
West /request cancelled by applicant 
383 North 400 West 
200 West 2280 North 
301 & 303 East 500 North 
343 West 1300 North 
1573 East 900 South 
531 South 300 West 
856 South 500 West 
450 east 300 North 
188 West 3300 North 
3218 North Cottonwood Lane 
628/630 ; 632/638 East 700 North 
Liberty Square / 556 North 400 East 
670 East 350 North 
659 North 300 East 

















































































































1543 West 1825 North 
3077 Bannock Drive 
1460 South University Ave. 
1233 West 1950 North / Lot 56 
4191 Imperial Way 
2348 Cambridge Circle 
199 South 1000 East 
audio recording PC commission mtg. 
854 East 350 North 
86 North University Avenue 
The Down Condominiums 
1366 East 1120 South 
324 East 300 South 
825 North 750 West / Accessory 
Dwelling Permit 
Zoning records for these properties 
1334 N. 900 E., 354/356 S. 500 E. 
336 /338 S. 300 E. 
All building .inspections, plans, etc. 
708 East 3900 North | 
zone verification records form file 
326 West 300 South 
481 North 500 East | 
471 North 500 East | 













































































































Nathan West [ 
1 1927 North 700 West 
J 127 South 800 West 
1 846 North 600 West 
| 1389 South 760 West 
| 337 North 700 East 
1 1067 North 750 West 
1169 South 760 West 
228 North 500 East 
475 /477 North 800 East 
2481 West 230 South 
241 South 400 West 
670 East 350 North 
150 West 300 South/ 257 South 500W 
496 South 1330 West 
745 West 100 North 
2241 South Larsen Parkway 
1104 North 1760 West (Parkridge 
Condos) 
1515 South University Ave. 
Planning Commission meeting of 
5/10/06 | 
2929 West 1010 North 
584 Wymount Terrace 
722 West 100 North 
3275 Mohican Way | 
Boeckel 
Boeckel 














































1 N/C 1 
1 -30 1 


































































Wells Fargo Bldg 
Branbury Park Apartments 
Arlington Place / Arlington Heights 
1 421 West 880 North 
Plans for Timpview High School 
Provo Towne Square; Occupancy 
permits, construction, Demolition 
800 South University Avenue 
151 East 200 North 
308 West 400 South 
846 North 600 West 
1389 South 760 West 
1555 North Grandview Lane 
1450 West 300 North 
3120 West Center 
885 east 3900 North 
530 East 600 North 
Copy PC meeting 6/14/06 
540,542,544 South State 
3325, 3355, 3507,3521,3549 N. 
University 
341/343 North 400 West | 
3362 North University Avenue 
2945 North Rolling Knolls Drive 
1295 East Cedar Ave. | 
510 East 2200 North | 
1 Cory B. 
Geniel D. 













































































































all current residential projects for 
1 11576 State #101A Draper Lane 
461 East 100 North 
1 150 North 1050 East 
University Plaza, Trellis On The 
Green, Village At Riverwoods, Villas 
1 At The Country Club 
1 57 North 1000 West 
2571 West 1680 North 
565 North Brookside Drive 
The Malt Shoppe; 1290 North 
University Avenue 
455 West 730 South 
3844 North 370 West 
1562 East Oak Cliff 
1336 North 900 East 
1295 East Briar 
390 East 300 North 
1295 Cedar Avenue 
1336 North 900 East 
363 North University Avenue 
542 East 400 North 
552 North 1080 West 
59 East 500 South/215 S. 500E | 



















































































1 9/21/06 -| 






























1 544 East 600 North 
247 North 400 East 
4667 Hillside Drive 
2091 South Nevada Avenue 
1134 West 500 North 
1726 South Buckley Lane 
476 North 200 East 
1881 West 430 South 
1050-1048 North 750 West 
645 East 600 North 
1335 North 1160 West 
556 East 300 North 
80 South 900 East 
600 North 544 East 
4541 Windsor Drive 
234 North 300 East 
788 North 1250 East 
Staff Reprot, Item 1 PC 9/13/06 
308 West 400 South 
690 West 890 North 
1244 S. 1410 E. | 
992 South University Ave. (Strip 
mall) 1 













































































































1 1000 West 600 South 
1 1675 North 200 West (lot 2) 
1243 North Jakeview Dr. 
1 544 East 600 North 
544 East 600 South 
4210 North Stone Crossing 
1402 Green Avenue 
495 West Center 
201 East Bay Boulevard 
544 East 600 North 
950 East 300 North 
544 East 600 North 
1139& 1141 West 650 North 
558 South State Street 
264 Thornberry Drive, Draper UT 
218 North 50 East 
329 North 800 East 
364 North 300 West 
449 West 1720 North /parking records 
2272 Mountain View Parkway 
464 W. 3700 N. , 404 W. 3700 N. , 




































































































1 458 West 400 South 
345 North Belmont Place 
257 N. 100 East 
404 West 3700 North/ all related 
documentation for this property 
364 West 3700 North/ all related 
documentation for this property 
1 15, 20 ,44 East 900 North 
1070 South State 
389 East 500 North 
Erickson Farms SD/ PC minutes & 
staff reports, final plat map 
360 & 466 West 4800 North 
380 North 1020 East 
653 South 880 West 
1200 North University Ave 
, • . • 1 
1 B.Pace 



























1 12.20 1 
N/C J 
N/C 1 
15.40 
23.00 J 
N/C 
11.00 1 
